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Abstract   Since a civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, independent media outlets, 
justice and accountability, and civil society builders organizations have striven to 
exert their right to freedom of expression—despite the local government’s efforts 
to undermine them on the streets and, in particular, in cyberspace. The Internet has 
proven to be an enabler of such rights, through which war crimes and other serious 
violations perpetrated by the Syrian government could be known by the 
international community. That really is in stark contrast to the Syrian pre-civil-war 
experience in the cyber realm, when freedom of expression was limited if not 
nonexistent. This paper analyzes two open questions in regard with that: how do 
actors working to promote the right for justice can use the Internet to coordinate 
with international organizations in pursuing justice and accountability efforts; and 
whether such emerging reality will resist a future in which Assad retains power of 
the country and censorship prevails over the Internet. Subsequently, this paper puts 
forward policy scenarios in which freedom of expression can achieve practical 
justice and accountability results through media and coordination efforts between 
local and international organizations.  
Keywords   Syria, civil war, freedom of expression, censorship, media literacy, 
advocacy, right to justice 
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Syrians use their right to freedom of expression to call for 
victims’ rights 
Eastern Ghouta was one of the last areas under opposition control 
since the uprising in 2011 evolved into a bloodshed civil war in Syria. 
As reported by Al-Jazeera, that changed when government forces 
took over most of the besieged area in early April, leaving opposition 
efforts at stake. Douma, one the largest towns in the region, had 
already been a victim of a deadly chemical attack, that left dozens 
dead and hundreds of others in critical condition,1 and prompted the 
US, France, and the UK to launch an aerial attack against chemical 
weapon facilities in Syria soon afterwards.2 Before such atrocities 
happened, the website Ghouta.com reported on the incidents. Likely 
unknown by western media outlets, Ghouta.com helped break the 
news by disseminating a report signed by the Union of Medical Care 
and Relief Organizations—which collected evidence on the ground 
about the attack and helped trigger western media outlets to cover the 
incident.3 
 After seven years of a civil war in Syria, freedom of expression 
has become if not the norm at least the practice between organizations 
building up civil society, independent media outlets, and justice and 
accountability efforts in the country—with the Internet being the 
platform that enabled this right, as Ghouta.com shows. Before that, 
                                                        
1 Hubbard, Ben. “Dozens Suffocate in Syria as Government Is Accused 
of Chemical Attack.” The New York Times, April 8, 2018, sec. Middle East. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/world/middleeast/syria-chemi-
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Weapons Attack - The New York Times.” Accessed May 26, 2018. 
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freedom of expression on the Internet was limited or even 
nonexistent.4 More than facilitating freedom of expression, the 
Internet has become one of the single sources documenting what 
happens in Syria because the regime banned journalists from directly 
accessing the country after the war broke out.5 
The website Ghouta.com is one example that combines freedom of 
expression—the right one has to express his thoughts without 
constraints6—with the mission of bringing about justice and 
accountability arising from the conflict. The website serves as a 
digital hub hosting reports released by a coalition of organizations on 
what is the current landscape of siege Ghouta. It is also a 
communication tool aimed at connecting foreign journalists with 
activists and witnesses on the ground to increase international 
awareness. The website is a product of a partnership between the 
Syrian Civil Society Coalition (Shaml), a network of regionally-based 
Syrian organizations in Turkey, PAX for peace, and international 
organizations working on conflicts worldwide, according to Fadi 
Hakim, Program Manager of Shaml.7 According to Hakim, among the 
many goals of the initiative is the use of advocacy efforts to raise 
awareness for atrocities committed in the heat of the war that can help 
hold to account perpetrators of war crimes. 
One example came out on May 11, 2018, when Ghouta.com 
published a report prepared by the Syrian Network for Human Rights 
(SNHR).8 The report brought evidence that linked Syrian armed 
                                                        
4 “Syria | OpenNet Initiative.” Accessed December 14, 2017. 
https://opennet.net/research/profiles/syria. 
5 Cottle, Simon, Richard Sambrook, and Nick Mosdell. Reporting Dan-
gerously: Journalist Killings, Intimidation and Security. Springer, 2016. 
6 “OHCHR | International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Ac-
cessed May 26, 2018. 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx. 
7 “Interview with Fadi Hakim, Program Manager of the Syrian Civil So-
ciety Coalition/Shaml,” February 12, 2018. 
8 “Additional Evidences and Investigations Prove That the Syrian Re-
gime Was Probably Implicated in Attacking Douma City Using Chemical 
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forces to the use of chemical attacks in Ghouta. Besides compiling 
evidence (photos, witnesses’ accounts, and the use of open source 
platforms to facilitate investigations), the report provides 
recommendations to the United Nations Security Council and human 
rights bodies, calling for further legal investigations on the incident 
that can establish the links between victims and perpetrators. 
Ghouta.com has been shared by hundreds of activists on social media, 
including Twitter and Facebook, in grassroots-like campaigns.9  
Yet, as Ghouta illustrates, the Syrian government, backed up by 
allies such as Russia, has intensified its efforts against opposition 
groups and regained territories it had lost since 2011.10 Besides that, 
it’s unclear for Shaml how such efforts translate into effective 
coordination with international organizations such as the International 
Commission of Inquiry of Syria (COI), established by the United 
Nations, or the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism 
(IIIM), a justice mechanism set up in 2016 by the UN to investigate 
unlawful acts under Public International Law committed in Syria 
since 2011.11 As the report by SNHR published on Ghouta.com stated, 
despite the deployment of over 200 chemical attacks in Syria, few of 
these incidents triggered an international response.12 
As uncertainty strikes organizations using the Internet to express 
and release information on perpetrators of atrocities in the war, at least 
                                                        




9 “Ghouta - Home.” Accessed May 26, 2018. https://www.face-
book.com/ActForGhouta/?ref=br_rs. 
10 “Syrian Civil War Map: Who’s in Control Where.” Accessed May 26, 
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11 “Mandate | IIIM.” Accessed May 26, 2018. https://iiim.un.org/man-
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12 “Mandate | IIIM.” Accessed May 26, 2018. https://iiim.un.org/man-
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two main questions remain open. One is how actors working to 
promote the right for justice can use the Internet to coordinate with 
organizations such as the IIIM. Another is whether justice and 
accountability efforts will resist a future in which Assad retains power 
of the country and censorship prevails over the Internet as it did before 
2011, putting at stake not only freedom of expression but also justice 
for victims. 
 
Freedom of expression stumbles upon the lack of an 
international response to Syrian needs 
If efforts deployed by Shaml and Pax, like with Ghouta.com, are 
properly designed despite the limited access to international actors 
involved in the Syrian conflict, they remain a great exception of 
organizations using the internet to communicate to the outside world 
what takes place in Syria. Many organizations—be them media 
outlets or justice and accountability by nature—work toward justice, 
examples being Syrians for Truth and Justice, Syrian Legal 
Development Program, Violations Documentation Center, or 
Verify.sy. Although some of these organizations have been sourced 
in articles featured in major international media outlets, most of their 
work has had limited impact with international organizations directly 
involved in evidence documentation for prosecution efforts. One 
reason for this is that organizations such as COI and IIIM operate with 
different communication and investigation procedures because of 
their mandate given by the UN. But weak dissemination of content 
among major media outlets also limits the international engagement, 
vital to trigger direct responses on the ground in Syria.  
According to Assaad Al Achi, program director of Baytna Syria, 
an organization set up in Turkey to foster civil society movements in 
diverse areas, this happens because the of the way messages are 
crafted. The main issue is how freedom of expression has been 
exercised by organizations working on justice and accountability and 
how that message has proved insufficient and ineffective. As an 
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example, Al Achi mentioned the case of the Syrian city of Madaya. 
In 2015, the city suffered from an unfolding famine. Although major 
international organizations such as Amnesty International and CNN 
reported on the case,13 Al Achi mentioned that the situation on the 
ground was much worse. He said that, along with other Syrian 
activists, he questioned why the international response was limited 
despite regionally-based Syrian organizations having communicated 
on the incident with plenty of photos and other additional evidence 
through the Internet. “I think the main reason the message failed is, 
first, because the channeling of the message was wrong. Second, there 
was a language barrier (since messages were being disseminated in 
Arabic), and third because there was no mobilization at the 
international front because there was no involvement of Syrian 
diaspora communities,” he noted.14 
That’s important despite the organizations’ efforts to use the 
Internet as a way of better informing the international community on 
events taking place in Syria. Although it lacks in-depth investigation 
in its reports, the website Verify.sy has fact-checked news 
disseminated by a Spanish website that accused the US for bombing 
a hospital in July 2016, when evidence suggested that Syrian forces 
launched the bombing campaign instead.15 Although publishing 
articles in English, the channel does not seem to have (at least it does 
not inform about) outreach strategies to make their work resonate 
across Syrian borders. One example in this case is that the English 
version of Verify on Facebook has 38 thousand followers only. Its 
Arabic version has 108 thousand followers. 
                                                        
13 “Syria Report: Famine in Madaya ‘the Tip of an Iceberg’ - CNN.” 
Accessed May 26, 2018. https://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/09/mid-
dleeast/syria-madaya-starvation/index.html. 
14 “Interview with Assaad Al Achi, Executive Director of Baytna Syria,” 
February 12, 2018. 
15 “Spanish Channels Use a Video Recording from a Hospital Bombed 





Examples like Verify.sy’s show that freedom of expression, in the 
Syrian context, has given room for a diverse body of organizations 
denouncing war crimes or collaborating to better inform international 
actors on atrocities being committed on the ground—thus, intending 
to bring about justice for Syrian victims. However, this has not yet 
resulted in palpable changes in the course of the conflict. This is 
because they are not reached by actors with the power to enable such 
changes—the international media being one example, since it can 
prompt international responses to issues on the ground, or 
international mechanisms for justice established at the UN level. And 
it continues to happen despite the high number of human rights 
violations evidence being disseminated on YouTube16 
Censorship and filtering: a gloomy future for freedom of 
expression in Syrian cyberspace? 
The emergence of evidence collection was a leap forward for 
organizations working on justice and accountability issues in the 
Syrian war, despite the limited impact achieved so far. But if their 
work result in reparations for victims of the conflict, it is their survival 
as free and independent organizations expressing themselves on 
cyberspace that is even more uncertain because of the evolving 
circumstances of the war, e.g. the Syrian government’s effective 
strategy of regaining control of Syria, leaving at stake organizations’ 
ability to freely communicate. To address this challenge, it’s worth 
understanding the policy practices imposed on the Internet by the 
Syrian government before the revolution to foresee some risks that 
organizations may face if the regime remains in power. 
In a report posted before the Arab Spring and the following Syrian 
revolution in 2011, the OpenNet Initiative highlighted that the 
                                                        
16 “Freedom on the Net: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital 
Media.” Freedom House, 2017. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/de-
fault/files/FOTN_2017_Full_Report.pdf. 
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Internet in Syria was controlled by the regime.17 According to the 
report, the government operated filtering on all four types of tools and 
content analyzed by the organizations. It had conducted a “pervasive 
filtering” of political content and Internet tools available for citizens 
and selective filtering of content related both to social media and to 
security or conflict. It did so, the report goes on, with a high 
consistency and very low transparency. Information in Syria was 
mainly explored by state-owned media outlets. According to the 
OpenNet study, the government imposed laws enabling censorship of 
the Internet, using as justification a fear of a Syrian divide and of 
“Israeli penetration” in the country. The Internet in Syria was, 
therefore, used to orient civil society in one way: that of the 
government’s interests in politics.18 
Although the Internet landscape in Syria has changed over the past 
seven years with more people connected to the Internet—for example, 
with over 30% of the local population having access to the Internet,19 
compared to only 22% of penetration in 201120—a stable regime can 
mean most civil society organizations denouncing regime abuse or 
unlawful actions according to international humanitarian law can 
experience a shift, a setback on freedom of expression back to pre-
uprising levels among civil society organizations operating with 
justice and accountability efforts if they move from Syrian hubs 
(Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan) back to Syria once the conflict is over. 
This would be the case since the government’s mechanisms for 
filtering cyberspace and promote Internet control haven’t been lifted; 
                                                        
17 “Syria | OpenNet Initiative.” Accessed May 26, 2018. https://open-
net.net/research/profiles/syria. 
18 “IFLA -- Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Syria 
Today.” Accessed May 26, 2018. 
https://www.ifla.org/ES/publications/freedom-of-expression-and-
access-to-information-in-syria-today#access. 
19 “Middle East Internet Stats and Telecommunications Reports.” Ac-
cessed May 26, 2018. https://www.internetworldstats.com/mid-
dle.htm#sy. 
20 “Syria Internet Users,” accessed April 12, 2018, http://www.inter-
netlivestats.com/internet-users/syria/. 
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in fact, freedom of expression is limited, particularly among media 
outlets, to a higher degree than it was in 2011.21 Content related to the 
opposition, groups advocating for human rights, and minorities in 
Syria are the target of such practices.22 
More than shutting down or blocking content related to the 
opposition, organizations working on justice and accountability issues 
in Syria have been target by the government in the physical realm.23 
The latest Freedom on the Net report by Freedom House has 
documented the danger and challenges arising from cyber-activism in 
Syria. It showed that employers of the Syrian Center for Media and 
Freedom of Expression after a government-raid in their offices in 
2012, and members of the VDC, for example, were kidnaped in the 
opposition-controlled area in which they operated in 2013.24 In 2017, 
one of the most emblematic digital activists of Syria, Bassel 
Khartabil, who battled for an open and free cyberspace in Syria, was 
assassinated in a regime-controlled prison, where he had been 
detained since 2013.25 The latest Freedom House report verified an 
increase in governmental censorship mechanisms and strategies to 
obstruct political dissent. 
Considering a conflict resolution, it seems unlikely that the regime 
would change its current policies on cyberspace toward relaxation or 
clarity over current filtering practices, even if they already fall short 
of the requirements established by international law: one being the 
existence of provisions by law in which the regime clarifies such 
practices; another being justifying such practices under the 
                                                        
21 “Syria,” April 26, 2017. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
established that filtering can be imposed if conditions of national 
security (and not regime-stability) and public order are met — none 
of these seem to hold in the current cyber-scape in Syria.26 Legislation 
changing as a point of departure, therefore, looks unfeasible and 
unlikely to take place in Syria in the short term. That leaves Syrian 
organizations working on justice and accountability through the 
Internet—be them based abroad, since they connect with sources 
inside Syria, or based inside Syria—and other civil society groups 
promoting human rights with fewer options to overcome such barriers 
in a future in which the regime regains stability. That does not mean 
they don’t have options left. 
How freedom of expression can achieve practical results through 
advocacy, outreach, and media literacy 
Better coordination with international actors is one way justice and 
accountability organizations can help raise awareness of what 
happens in Syria: be them human rights or war crimes incidents, or 
internet restrictions faced by local organizations. The Internet plays a 
vital role here. The solution for both issues can only be achieved if 
local actors invest in media literacy and outreach. The goal is to 
expand advocacy efforts while building resilience among actors on 
the ground.27 These methods are likely to raise awareness and help 
international actors more effectively act on human rights violations or 
war crimes accountability. As a result, they can also raise awareness 
at the local level.  
One way organizations such as Ghouta.com, Verify.sy, and Syrians 
For Truth and Justice can launch outreach strategies is by mapping 
international actors working on justice and accountability from 
                                                        
26 Rundle, Mary, and Malcolm Birdling. “Filtering and the International 
System: A Question of Commitment,” n.d., 30. 
27 “Policy Brief: Internet Shutdowns.” Internet Society (blog). Accessed 
May 27, 2018. https://www.internetsociety.org/policybriefs/internet-
shutdowns. 
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outside Syria. Examples are, but not limited to, COI or IIIM. Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International, two large NGOs working 
on the Syrian conflict, can benefit and support organizations based in 
Turkey or in Syria to reach wider audiences, since they can base their 
reports on information arising from these local hubs. In both cases, 
knowing the proper audience will help local organizations increase 
the pressure over the international community for incidents that would 
have otherwise gone unnoticed in the short term. 
Methods for outreach can include direct contact over email or the 
regular dissemination of newsletters to international organizations. A 
second step requires a mapping of what international organizations 
working on justice and accountability do and their interests. The style 
of newsletters, the content, and the techniques of advocacy aimed at 
international NGOs are likely to differ based on the interests of 
international organizations with the mandate of documenting war 
crimes. Organizations should plan their content in English for 
outreach; the organizations mentioned already post content on their 
websites in English. This overcomes the issue of having Arabic 
content missed by these organizations—even though Arabic is a UN 
language, a language barrier has impeded effective coordination 
between local and international organizations.28 Organizations with 
less professional capacity can work with clusters of Syrian 
organizations such as Shaml, formed by six different regionally-based 
Syrian organizations in Turkey to better integrate regionally-based 
organizations and grassroots initiatives on the ground in Syria.29  
Local organizations should use a mix of publications in these 
efforts: reporting not only what’s happening on the ground or sharing 
evidence collected by witnesses in the wake of incidents; but also on 
the challenges in conducting such work. This would include detailed 
information-sharing on barriers to access information in cyberspace 
in regions they operate; or the need for specifying the threats received. 
International organizations working on Syria are likely to better 
respond to, advocate for, and support overcoming identified issues 
                                                        
28 “Interview with Assaad Al Achi, Executive Director of Baytna Syria,” 
February 12, 2018. 
29 “Interview with Fadi Hakim, Program Manager of the Syrian Civil 
Society Coalition/Shaml,” February 12, 2018. 
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when conducting investigations on war crimes or human rights 
violations on the ground in Syria—even if the precise information 
shared by local or regionally-based actors are not necessarily used as 
the basis of investigations, since they can better inform and alert 
international actors about potential issues to investigate. The goal is 
for them to perform as a watchdog function.30 
Tackling Internet filtering is more challenging, especially in a 
scenario where the government regains stability over territories in 
Syria. There is no one-size-fits-all model for protection, since the 
government or censors can always catch up with technological 
enhancements in their efforts against opposition groups.31 Yet, 
regionally-based Syrian organizations in Turkey, such as Shaml or 
Syrians for Truth and Justice—both having trainings in their capacity-
building programs— should aim at including in their media literacy 
efforts techniques and software that can facilitate the process of 
circumventing censorship on the Internet for the communication 
process with the international community and among one another on 
the ground. Although digital safety needs in this context are extensive, 
aiming at external communication protection is top priority since the 
goal is to hide IP addresses and encrypt the traffic between the user 
and the service, which, in Syria, is provided by the government.32 One 
of the most popular examples for these are the browser Tor and the 
messenger app Signal. For organizations working on war crimes and 
human rights violations committees, such protection is vital since 
their work represents a threat to the stability of the regime. 
These media, outreach, and digital safety mechanisms may be 
overlooked by organizations already working on the Syrian conflict 
for so many years. Be the conflict over or not, victims of the war are 
more likely to access justice if first organizations battling for that 
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protect the right they have achieved since the uprising broke out: 
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